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Memories of near-death experiences (NDEs) are recalled as “realer” than memories
of other real or imagined events. Given their rich phenomenology, emotionality and
consequentiality, it was hypothesized that they could meet some aspects of the
definition of flashbulb memories. We aimed to identify and compare the episodic and
non-episodic information provided in verbal recollections of NDE, flashbulb, and control
autobiographical memories. The phenomenological characteristics and centrality of the
memories were also compared. Twenty-five participants who had lived a NDE in a
life-threatening situation were interviewed and completed the Memory Characteristics
Questionnaires as well as the Centrality of Event Scale for their NDE, a flashbulb and
another autobiographical memory used as control. Overall, transcribed NDE verbal
recollections included a higher overall amount of details and more internal/episodic
information than control autobiographical and flashbulb memories. Moreover, flashbulb
memories were associated to a lower intensity of feelings while remembering and a lower
personal importance, and are less reactivated and less susceptible to be remembered
from a first person perspective compared to NDE and control autobiographical
memories. Finally, NDE memories are the most central memories to experiencers’
identity, followed by control autobiographical and then by flashbulb memories. These
findings corroborate previous studies highlighting the impact and uniqueness of
NDE memories.
Keywords: autobiographical memory, near-death experience, flashbulb memory, autobiographical interview,
memory – consolidation
INTRODUCTION
Near-death experiences (NDEs) have been defined as psychological events usually occurring when
people are close to death or in situations of intense danger (Greyson, 2000b). These subjective
experiences contain some typical and recurrent features such as the vision of a bright light, out-
of-body experiences (OBEs) or coming to a border or a point of no return (Greyson, 1983;
Martial et al., 2017a; Cassol et al., 2018). Long regarded as taboo and out of reach for science,
the scientific study of the phenomenon emerged only four decades ago but recently led to
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an increasing number of empirical research (e.g., Van Lommel
et al., 2001; Palmieri et al., 2014; Martial et al., 2018, 2019a,b).
NDEs are of particular clinical relevance given their frequency of
appearance (i.e., between 6 and 23% of cardiac arrest survivors;
Van Lommel et al., 2001; Schwaninger et al., 2002; Greyson, 2003)
and their consequences on NDE experiencers’ (also labeled as
“NDErs”) lives (Groth-Marnat and Summers, 1998; Cassol et al.,
2019a). Numerous aftereffects have been reported, such as the
development of a higher spirituality, less materialistic values or a
reduced fear of death (Noyes, 1980; Groth-Marnat and Summers,
1998; Knoblauch et al., 2001).
Previous studies have highlighted the uniqueness of NDE
memories within autobiographical memory (i.e., memories about
an individual’s life; Williams et al., 2008). NDE memories
were found to contain more details (e.g., sensory, emotional,
and self-referential) than memories of other real and imagined
events, and memories of a period of coma or impaired
consciousness following an acquired severe brain dysfunction
without NDE (Thonnard et al., 2013). Thus, it was suggested
that they could not be considered as imagined event memories.
Other studies have found that richer NDEs (i.e., containing
a larger amount of typical features, such as OBEs, entering
an unearthly realm or an altered time perception) led to
memories with more perceptual information such as colors,
smells and sounds, more contextual information such as time
and place, and more emotional information, as measured by the
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson et al.,
1988; Martial et al., 2017b; Moore and Greyson, 2017). At
first sight, the important amount of phenomenological details
contained in their recollections might seem counter-intuitive
given that NDEs are assumed to occur during an altered state
of consciousness and are classically associated with a critical or
confused state (e.g., Van Lommel et al., 2001). In an effort to
explain the special nature of NDE memories, different theories
have been put forth. It was suggested that the significant
emotionality associated with these mental events could enhance
the quantity of sensory details stored in memory (Schaefer and
Philippot, 2005). Besides, emotional events are more likely to be
frequently rehearsed, therefore potentially increasing the amount
of memorized characteristics (Thonnard et al., 2013).
Given their emotionality and consequentiality (i.e., the
consequences of the event or aftermath; e.g., Cassol et al.,
2019a,b), some authors hypothesized that NDE memories could
meet some aspects of the definition of a particular kind
of autobiographical memories known as flashbulb memories
(Thonnard et al., 2013). Flashbulb memories refer to very
vivid and long-lasting memories of the circumstances in which
one learned about a shocking public event (Brown and Kulik,
1977). Studies on flashbulb memories have been focusing on
landmark events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks or
the death/assassination of famous people (Finkenauer et al., 1998;
Curci et al., 2001; Tinti et al., 2009). A prominent feature of
these memories is that they display high ratings of belief in
accuracy/subjective certainty (Brown and Kulik, 1977; Kraha and
Boals, 2014) and that people can usually remember some of their
personal aspects for several decades (Berntsen and Thomsen,
2005), for example the place they were when they heard the
news, who they were with, the clothes they were wearing,
or the emotions felt at the time of the event (Luminet and
Curci, 2009). Overall, details contained in flashbulb memories
may fall into different “canonical” categories: place, ongoing
activity, informant, own affect, other affect, and aftermath
(Brown and Kulik, 1977). The level of consequentiality associated
with flashbulb memories and the underlying memory processes,
however, remain debated. Pioneers in the area have suggested
that these memories do not imply the existence of a special
memory mechanism and include the notion of consequentiality
as a key element in the formation of these memories, along
with novelty, surprise, emotionality and overt rehearsal [i.e.,
overt rehearsal takes place during conversations, contrary to
covert rehearsal which takes place when one thinks about the
event (Brown and Kulik, 1977; Finkenauer et al., 1998; Talarico
and Rubin, 2003)]. However, results from other studies suggest
different underlying memory processes for memories of learning
about public news (such as flashbulb memories) and memories
for private events (i.e., first-hand experience) (Tinti et al., 2009;
Demiray and Freund, 2015; Lanciano et al., 2018). For example,
first-hand experiences would show a higher consequentiality
and life impact, and would have a protective function because
their content is related to the individual’s personal identity and
well-being (Pillemer, 2009).
Generally speaking, narratives of autobiographical memories
are known to be multifaceted in content and to include both
episodic (i.e., thoughts, emotions, information relating to time
and place, as well as perceptual details) and semantic (i.e.,
general knowledge and facts about the world and personal life)
information (Levine et al., 2002; Addis et al., 2008, 2010). Given
that episodic and semantic memory are thought to rely on
different neural processes (Moscovitch et al., 2005), Levine et al.
(2002) have developed an Autobiographical Memory Interview
(AI) which includes a reliable coding scheme enabling the
distinction between episodic and non-episodic details comprised
in verbalized autobiographical memories. In their AI coding
scheme, episodic details (scored by using categories adapted from
the MCQ) refer to the central event and its emotional, perceptual,
temporal and spatial characteristics, and non-episodic details
relate to repetitions, metacognitive statements, and information
that does not pertain to the main event or that is not contextually
bounded, such as general knowledge or facts. While the former
seem essential for high-fidelity representation of personally
experienced events, the latter rather contribute to the coherence
and continuity of self-knowledge and identity through time
(Levine et al., 2002). To date, the AI scoring scheme has been
used in a wide range of studies related to memory processes
in aging (e.g., Levine et al., 2002), psychiatric conditions (e.g.,
Moscovitch et al., 2018), neurodegeneration (e.g., Bastin et al.,
2013) or lesion cases (e.g., Steinvorth et al., 2005). However, no
study has yet investigated the episodic and semantic composition
of NDE verbal recollections as well as the comparison with
those of flashbulb memories. Therefore, the primary aim of this
study was to (1) assess whether the episodic and non-episodic
information comprised in verbal recollections of NDE, flashbulb
and control autobiographical memories differ and (2) further
compare their phenomenological characteristics using the sMCQ
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(a short version of the MCQ; Johnson et al., 1988; D’Argembeau
and Van der Linden, 2008) and their consequentiality by means
of the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen and Rubin, 2006).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
NDErs were recruited via the websites, appearances in local
media and publications of the International Association for
Near-Death Studies (IANDS France), the Coma Science Group
(University of Liège, Belgium). Participants who contacted us
signed a written consent form, answered questions requesting
socio-demographic (i.e., gender and age at interview) as well as
clinical information (i.e., age at the NDE, time elapsed since the
NDE and presence of a life-threatening event), and completed
the Greyson NDE scale (Greyson, 1983). This 16-item multiple-
choice validated scale enables a standardized identification of
a NDE (Greyson, 1983; Lange et al., 2004) as well as the
quantification of its intensity (i.e., total score ranging from 0
to 32). For each of the 16 items, the scores are arranged on an
ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2 (i.e., 0 = not present, 1 = mildly
or ambiguously present, and 2 = definitively present).
Ultimately, we included 25 participants whose experience
had been lived in a life-threatening situation and who met
the accepted criteria of a NDE (i.e., Greyson NDE scale’s total
score ≥ 7). The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of
the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Liège.
Experimental Task
Screening Tasks
The first step of the face-to-face interview consisted of a screening
assessment in order to detect and exclude memory biases related
to negative mood as well as mild cognitive impairments.
Regarding negative mood, the 25 NDErs completed the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al.,
1988). The PANAS consists of 20 emotion words, with 10 loading
on the Positive Affect factor and 10 on the Negative Affect one.
This scale assesses participants’ baseline mood levels. The positive
subscale (PANAS+) includes words such as “alert,” “inspired,” or
“enthusiastic,” whereas the negative subscale (PANAS−) includes
words such as “distressed,” “upset,” or “guilty.” Participants rate
the degree to which they endorse each item on a rating scale
ranging from 1 = very slightly or not at all to 5 = extremely. Items
are then summed to create a score for each factor. Higher scores
represent greater endorsement of the construct.
Potential mild cognitive impairments were assessed using
the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al.,
2005). This scale includes 30 items assessing multiple cognitive
domains: short-term memory (5 points); visuospatial abilities via
clock drawing (3 points) and a cube copy task (1 point); executive
functioning via an adaptation of Trail Making Test Part B (1
point), phonemic fluency (1 point) and verbal abstraction (2
points); attention, concentration and working memory via target
detection (1 point), serial subtraction (3 points), digits forward (1
point) and digits backward (1 point); language via confrontation
naming with low-familiarity animals (3 points) and repetition of
complex sentences (2 points); and orientation to time and place
(6 points). Items are summed to create a score and the clinical
cut-off score is equal to 26.
Autobiographical Memory Interview (Levine et al.,
2002)
Once participants were screened for mood and for memory
impairments, the interviews were carried out based on the
probing and scoring recommendations of the Autobiographical
Memory Interview (AI) by Levine et al. (2002). We conducted a
semi-structured interview in a quiet room for each participant.
Specifically, participants were asked to freely describe in
considerable detail three target memories dating (without
restriction regarding the recall time), as far as possible, to the
same period: (1) the memory of their NDE, (2) a flashbulb
memory (they were provided with a definition and examples;
i.e., memories of the circumstances in which one first learned
of a very surprising and consequential or emotionally arousing
event such as September 11 terrorist attacks), and (3) an
autobiographical memory. Each event had to be temporally and
contextually specific, that is, occurring over minutes or hours
but not exceeding a day. The order in which the memories
were to be recalled was randomized. According to the AI
guidelines, two further levels of recall may be needed in case of
a lack of key information: (1) general and (2) specific probing.
General probes are non-specific cues aiming to encourage full
description (e.g., “Can you tell me more about it?”). Specific
probes cue precise aspects of the event in order to determine
if participants remember more information (e.g., “Where did
this event take place?”). Nevertheless, no specific probe was
employed in the present study due to substantial recalls by
our participants. Narratives were audio-recorded, transcribed
and analyzed using the established manual scoring procedure,
allowing to separate episodic details (i.e., description of the event,
sensory or mental state details specific to the event; “internal
details”) from non-episodic details (i.e., semantic or factual
statements, or other details not specific to the event; “external
details”) (Levine et al., 2002).
Questionnaires
Finally, after each memory recall, participants completed a short
version of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (sMCQ;
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden, 2008; adapted from Johnson
et al., 1988) and the Centrality of Event Scale (CES; Berntsen
and Rubin, 2006). The former assesses memory clarity, sensory
details, self-referential and emotional information, reactivation
frequency, and confidence in the memory by means of 16 items
(each rated on a 1–7 point Likert scale). The latter is a 20-item
instrument that measures how central an event is to a person’s
identity and life story. All items are rated on a 5-point scale
ranging from 1 = totally disagree to 5 = totally agree. The three
groups of items provide an assessment of whether an event has
become a reference point for the generation of expectations to
other events in the respondent’s life story, whether an event is
considered as a central component of the person’s identity, and
whether the event is considered as a turning point in one’s life
story, respectively.
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Analysis
Data analyses were carried out using Jamovi statistical
software (1.1.9.0).
Study Sample
Greyson NDE scale total scores, age at NDE and age at
interview are summarized as mean ± standard deviation (SD).
Distributions being skewed, results at the PANAS and the
MoCA are summarized as median (inter-quartile range; IQR),
and differences for time since event (NDE vs. flashbulb vs.
autobiographical) were analyzed using Friedman tests and
expressed as median (IQR) and average rank.
Autobiographical Memory Interview
Transcribed recalls were segmented into “details,” or “segments.”
A detail is defined as “a unique occurrence, observation, or
thought, generally expressed as a grammatical clause” (Levine
et al., 2002). A segment can be defined as a sentence or part of a
sentence that conveys information. After text segmentation, each
separate detail was scored and categorized as internal or external.
Internal details pertain to the main event and are episodic
in nature, whereas external details are not directly related to
the main event and may correspond to semantic information.
Internal details are subdivided into: (1) event details, which
describe the unfolding of the story (e.g., happenings, persons
involved, reactions/emotions of oneself or other people, one’s
clothing, the weather); (2) the time (e.g., life epoch, day,
month, year, season, and clock time); (3) the place (i.e., any
information that involves localization in space, such as a city,
a street, a building, a room); (4) perceptual details (i.e., visual,
olfactory, tactile, gustatory, auditory information, proprioceptive,
or nociceptive information); and (5) thoughts and emotions
(relating to the mental state of the subject). Apart from semantic
information, repetitions of information and other unrelated
details (i.e., time, place, event, perceptual and emotional details
that do not directly pertain to the main event) are classified
as external. Two independent raters (HC and EB) analyzed
each transcribed recall by scoring each detail. Scoring reliability
was assessed using intra-class correlation (ICC) coefficients,
showing that both raters scored the narratives in a highly
reliable manner (ICCinternal details = 0.99; ICCexternal details = 0.98).
Residual discrepancies between raters were discussed later on
to reach a final classification for all details. Based on this final
classification, all subtypes of details generated spontaneously
were summed across memories.
For each type of memory, the measures of interest were the
overall amount of (1) internal and (2) external details. First,
we looked at potential associations between the number of
reported details and demographic variables (i.e., age at NDE,
age at event and time since event) using Pearson’s correlations,
as well as between these details and the MoCA total scores
using Spearman’s correlations given that they were not normally
distributed. Second, we looked at the difference in the amount of
internal and external details reported for each type of memory.
Variables being normally distributed, differences between groups
were assessed using two-ways repeated measures analysis of
variance (rmANOVAs), with the type of details (interval vs.
external) and the type of memory (NDE vs. flashbulb vs.
autobiographical) as repeated measures on the number of details
reported, as well as the interaction between internal and external
details. In case of violation of sphericity, we used a Greenhouse–
Geisser correction. Results were considered significant at p = 0.05.
In case of significant results, we performed post hoc comparisons
using Tukey HSD, setting the level of significance at 0.017
after Bonferroni correction. Regarding additional measures, we
looked at the effect of the memory type on the amount of
subtypes of internal and external memory details (i.e., event,
perceptual, emotional and semantic details, as well as time, place
and repetitions). Distributions being skewed, differences between
groups were assessed using Friedman tests and results were
considered significant at p = 0.004 after Bonferroni correction.
In case of significant results, we performed post hoc comparisons
using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, setting the level of significance
at 0.017 after Bonferroni correction.
Questionnaires
CES total scores were analyzed using an rmANOVA. Answers
at the sMCQ being ordinal data measures, memories (NDE
vs. flashbulb vs. autobiographical) were compared using a
Friedman test, setting the level of significance at 0.003 after
Bonferroni correction. In case of significant results, we performed
post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD tests for rmANOVAs and
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for Friedman tests, setting the level
of significance at 0.017 after Bonferroni correction. Additionally,
we examined associative strength between CES total scores and
reported details (i.e., internal and external score) as well as sMCQ
items using Spearman’s correlations.
RESULTS
Study Sample
Our sample includes 25 NDErs who have experienced a NDE
following a life-threatening situation such as anoxia (e.g., cardiac
arrest, near-drowning; n = 8), trauma (e.g., motor vehicle
accident, falls; n = 6) or other events (non-traumatic events such
as complication during surgery; n = 11). Participants’ negative
mood was not higher than normal (i.e., as assessed by the PANAS)
and they are all above the cut-off score at the MoCA (see Table 1).
All participants were able to recall a flashbulb memory and
an autobiographical memory that happened around the same
time as the NDE. Recalled memories did not differ regarding
the number of years elapsed since the event (medianNDE = 27,
IQR = 10–45, average rank = 2.24; medianFlashbulb = 17, IQR = 15–
27, average rank = 1.68; medianAutobiographical = 26, IQR = 12–
42, average rank = 2.08; [X2(2) = 4.622, p = 0.099, kendall
coefficient = 0.092]). Recalled flashbulb memories were the
following: the assassination of J. F. Kennedy (n = 1), the first
steps on the moon (n = 5), the fall of the Berlin wall (n = 2),
death of King Baudouin of Belgium (n = 3), death of Princess
Diana (n = 1), September 11 terrorist attacks (n = 8), Liège
shooting attack (n = 4), and Paris terrorist attacks (n = 1).
Demographic and clinical information of the entire sample can
be found in Table 1.
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TABLE 1 | Demographic and clinical information for NDErs (n = 25; 10 females).
Age at interview (in years)
Mean ± SD 59 ± 12
Age at NDE (in years)
Mean ± SD 31 ± 20
Reported time since NDE (in years)
Mean ± SD 28 ± 19
Greyson NDE scale total score
Mean ± SD 15 ± 5
PANAS +
Median (IQR) 35 (29–39)
PANAS −
Median (IQR) 12 (10–16)
MoCA
Median (IQR) 29 (28–30)
NDE, near-death experiences; NDErs, near-death experiencers; SD, standard
deviation; IQR, inter-quartile range.
Autobiographical Memory Interview
First, we found no significant association between demographic
variables and the amount of reported details. Precisely, the age at
interview was not correlated with the amount of internal details
comprised in NDE (r =−0.188, p = 0.367), flashbulb (r =−0.063,
p = 0.764) and autobiographical (r = 0.175, p = 0.402) memories,
as well as the amount of external details of NDE (r = 0.051,
p = 0.808) flashbulb (r =−0.230, p = 0.270) and autobiographical
memories (r = 0.055, p = 0.794). The age at event was not
correlated with the amount of internal details comprised in NDE
(r = −0.292, p = 0.156), flashbulb (r = 0.243, p = 0.242) and
autobiographical memories (r = −0.077, p = 0.715), as well as
the amount of external details of NDE (r = 0.051, p = 0.808)
flashbulb (r =−0.126, p = 0.548) and autobiographical memories
(r = 0.024, p = 0.910). Finally, the time since event was not
correlated with the amount of internal details comprised in NDE
(r = 0.174, p = 0.405), flashbulb (r = −0.297, p = 0.149) and
autobiographical memories (r = 0.199, p = 0.340), as well as
the amount of external details of NDE (r = 0.006, p = 0.977),
flashbulb (r =−0.037, p = 0.861) and autobiographical memories
(r =−0.283, p = 0.171).
Second, we found no significant association between the
MoCA total scores and the amount of internal details comprised
in NDE (rho = −0.334, p = 0.103), flashbulb (r = −0.276,
p = 0.183), and autobiographical (rho = 0.061, p = 0.771),
memories, as well as the amount of external details of NDE
(r = −0.378, p = 0.062) flashbulb (r = 0.369, p = 0.188), and
autobiographical memories (r =−0.199, p = 0.341).
Finally, the rmANOVA revealed a main effect of the type of
detail [F(1,24) = 32.4, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.575], NDErs recalled
a higher overall amount of internal details (M = 29.1, SD = 26)
compared to external ones (M = 13.4, SD = 11.8). We also
found a main effect of the type of memory [F(1.22,29.35) = 28.2,
p > 0.001, η2p = 0.54]. The overall amount of details was
higher for the NDE (M = 36.4, SD = 30.2) compared to the
flashbulb (M = 12.5, SD = 8.47; t = 6.813, p = 0.001) and the
autobiographical memory (M = 14.8, SD = 8.74; t = −6.151,
p < 0.001), which did not differ from each other (t = 0.662,
p = 0.786). Lastly, the interaction between the type of detail and
the type of memory was also significant [F(1.42,34.10) = 19.3,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.445]. Specifically, the number of internal details
reported for NDE memories (M = 53, SD = 32.7) is higher than
the internal details reported for flashbulb (M = 16, SD = 8.90;
t = 8.660, p < 0.001) and autobiographical memories (M = 18.2,
SD = 5.29; t = −8.127, p < 0.001), and higher than the amount
of external details reported for NDE (M = 19.8, SD = 14.6;
t = 8.420, p < 0.001), flashbulb (M = 9.08, SD = 6.53; t = 9.402,
p < 0.001) and autobiographical memories (M = 11.4, SD = 10.02;
t = 8.897, p < 0.001). The other conditions did not significantly
differ (all ps > 0.14).
Differences in episodic and non-episodic subcomponents of
NDE, flashbulb and autobiographical memories can be found
in Table 2. Results indicated a main effect of the memory
type on the amount of event and perceptual internal details
(see Table 2). Specifically, post hoc comparisons indicated
that NDE memories contained significantly more internal
event details than autobiographical (V = 12, p < 0.001) and
flashbulb memories (V = 19, p < 0.001). Autobiographical and
flashbulb memories did not differ (V = 80, p = 0.223). NDE
memories also showed higher ratings for internal perceptual
details as compared to autobiographical (V = 3.5, p < 0.001)
and flashbulb memories (V = 246, p < 0.001). Once again,
autobiographical and flashbulb memories did not differ (V = 54.5,
p = 0.775). No other significant difference was observed.
Although not significant when considering Bonferroni correction
for multiple comparisons, there was a trend for higher emotional
internal details associated with the NDE compared to other
types of memories.
Questionnaires
Short Memory Characteristics Questionnaire
Median ratings for each characteristic as a function of the type of
memory are presented in Table 3. Results indicated a between-
memory difference in the (1) feeling of mentally reliving the
event, (2) sensation of feeling the emotions felt during the
event while remembering, (3) visual perspective taken while
remembering, (4) emotions felt at the time of the event (i.e.,
valence), (5) personal importance attached to the event, and (6)
reactivation frequency. Memories did not differ in the amount
of sensory details, clarity (i.e., time, location and coherence),
confidence in the memory as well as remembering one’s own
actions/words/thoughts. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the
feeling of mentally reliving the event is higher in autobiographical
memories as compared to flashbulb memories (V = 187,
p = 0.002). NDE memories did not differ from autobiographical
(V = 32, p = 0.361) and flashbulb memories (V = 144, p = 0.049).
The sensation of feeling the emotions felt during the event while
remembering is higher in NDE and autobiographical memories
compared to flashbulb memories (V = 192, p = 0.001 and V = 20,
p < 0.001, respectively), but did not differ between NDE and
autobiographical memories (V = 37.5, p = 0.109). Regarding
visual perspective, flashbulb memories showed lower scores than
NDE (V = 162.5, p < 0.001) and autobiographical memories
(V = 4.5, p < 0.001) indicating that they were less susceptible
to be remembered from a first-person perspective. Difference
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TABLE 2 | Episodic/internal and non-episodic/external subcomponents of NDE (n = 25), flashbulb (n = 25), and autobiographical memories (n = 25).












X2 Df p-value Kendall
coefficient
Internal
Event 20 (9–33) 2.62 6 (3–10) 1.50 10 (4–12) 1.88 18.431 2 <0.004* 0.369
Time 2 (1–3) 2.10 1 (1–2) 1.64 2 (1–3) 2.26 6.241 2 0.044 0.125
Place 1 (0–2) 2.02 1 (1–2) 2.18 1 (0–2) 1.80 2.844 2 0.241 0.057
Perceptual 7 (3–12) 2.76 0 (0–2) 1.58 0 (0–2) 1.66 27.175 2 <0.004* 0.544
Emotional 10 (5–16) 2.48 3 (2–6) 1.70 6 (2–8) 1.82 9.800 2 0.007 0.196
External
Event 7 (1–13) 2.36 2 (1–3) 1.62 3 (1–6) 2.02 7.708 2 0.021 0.154
Time 0 (0–0) 2.06 0 (0–0) 2.00 0 (0–0) 1.94 0.750 2 0.687 0.015
Place 0 (0–0) 1.98 0 (0–0) 1.96 0 (0–0) 2.06 0.378 2 0.828 0.057
Perceptual 0 (0–1) 2.16 0 (0–0) 1.80 0 (0–0) 2.04 7.000 2 0.030 0.140
Emotional 1 (0–5) 2.16 1 (0–2) 1.96 0 (0–2) 1.88 1.489 2 0.476 0.030
Semantic 1 (0–3) 1.98 3 (1–4) 2.24 1 (0–2) 1.78 3.325 2 0.190 0.067
Repetition 3 (1–4) 2.32 2 (1–2) 1.88 1 (0–3) 1.80 4.722 2 0.094 0.094
Results for the AI (autobiographical memory interview) details are considered statistically significant at p < 0.004 after Bonferroni correction. *Results are significant. NDE,
near-death experience; IQR, inter-quartile range; Df, degree of freedom.
TABLE 3 | Score differences between NDE (n = 25), flashbulb (n = 25), and autobiographical (n = 25) memories on the sMCQ.












X2 Df p-value Kendall
coefficient
Reexperiencing 6 (6–7) 2.20 5 (3–6) 1.50 7 (6–7) 2.30 12.500 2 0.002* 0.250
Visual details 7 (6–7) 2.20 6 (6–7) 1.76 7 (6–7) 2.04 4.863 2 0.088 0.097
Other sensory details 6 (5–7) 2.36 4 (2–5) 1.60 6 (4–7) 2.04 9.455 2 0.009 0.189
Location 7 (7–7) 2.10 7 (7–7) 2.02 7 (6–7) 1.88 1.676 2 0.433 0.034
Time 4 (1–6) 1.86 6 (5–6) 2.32 5 (2–6) 1.82 4.437 2 0.109 0.089
Coherence 7 (7–7) 2.22 7 (5–7) 1.72 7 (6–7) 2.06 7.244 2 0.027 0.145
Verbal component 5 (4–7) 2.12 5 (4–6) 1.92 6 (3–6) 1.96 0.903 2 0.637 0.018
Feeling emotions 6 (5–7) 2.12 5 (3–6) 1.48 7 (6–7) 2.40 13.728 2 0.001* 0.275
Real/imagined 7 (7–7) 2.08 7 (7–7) 1.96 7 (7–7) 1.96 1.200 2 0.548 0.024
One’s own actions 7 (6–7) 2.28 6 (4–7) 1.58 7 (6–7) 2.14 11.064 2 0.004 0.221
One’s own words 7 (5–7) 2.18 4 (3–7) 1.80 6 (4–7) 2.02 2.563 2 0.278 0.051
One’s own thoughts 7 (7–7) 2.38 6 (4–7) 1.74 6 (6–7) 1.88 8.448 2 0.015 0.169
Visual perspective 7 (7–7) 2.28 5 (1–6) 1.30 7 (7–7) 2.42 27.382 2 <0.003* 0.548
Valence 7 (6–7) 2.24 3 (2–4) 1.24 7 (6–7) 2.52 28.658 2 <0.003* 0.573
Personal importance 7 (6–7) 2.42 3 (2–4) 1.30 7 (5–7) 2.28 22.707 2 <0.003* 0.454
Reactivation frequency 6 (5–6) 2.38 3 (2–4) 1.34 5 (5–6) 2.28 20.835 2 <0.003* 0.416
IQR, inter-quartile range; Df, degrees of freedom. *Results are significant. Results are considered statistically significant at p < 0.003 after Bonferroni correction.
between NDE and autobiographical memories did not reach
significance (V = 24, p = 0.438). Flashbulb memories also showed
lower scores for the valence as compared to NDE (V = 207.5,
p < 0.001) and autobiographical memories (V = 232, p = 0.001;
NDE and autobiographical memories did not differ, V = 74.5,
p = 0.171), indicating that the latter were more positive in average.
NDE and autobiographical memories also scored higher than
flashbulb memories in terms of personal importance (V = 250,
p < 0.001 and V = 7.5, p < 0.001, respectively). On the other
hand, difference between NDE and autobiographical memories
did not reach significance (V = 30.5, p = 0.307). Finally, NDE
and autobiographical memories were more frequently shared and
reactivated than flashbulb memories (V = 211.5, p < 0.001 and
V = 194, p < 0.001, respectively). Once again, difference between
NDE and autobiographical memories did not reach significance
(V = 73.5, p = 0.793).
Centrality of Event Scale
There was a significant effect of the memory type on the
reported centrality [F(2,48) = 48.256, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.668].
Post hoc comparisons indicated that the mean score for the
NDE memory (M = 81.4, SD = 15.767) was significantly higher
than for the autobiographical memory (M = 62, SD = 23.429)
[F(1,24) = 12.767, p = 0.002] as well as for the flashbulb memory
(M = 35.36, SD = 12.783) [F(1,24) = 115.525, p < 0.001].
Moreover, the autobiographical memory score was significantly
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higher than the flashbulb memory score [F(1,24) = 38.149,
p < 0.001]. Additionally, a significant positive correlation was
found between CES scores and the number of reported internal
details (rs = 0.512, p < 0.001), but not with the number of external
details (rs = 0.208, p = 0.073).
Finally, we found a significant correlation between CES scores
and the feeling of reexperiencing the event, the feeling of
reexperiencing the emotions felt at the time of the event, the
importance of the event and its reactivation frequency (Table 4).
DISCUSSION
Previous studies have highlighted the vivid nature and high
consequentiality of NDE memories (Thonnard et al., 2013;
Martial et al., 2017b; Moore and Greyson, 2017; Cassol
et al., 2019a,b), leading to the assumption that they could
be underpinned by the same memory processes as flashbulb
memories (Thonnard et al., 2013). Therefore, the aim of this
study was to adopt a more fine-grained approach to highlight
and compare the episodic and non-episodic contributions to
the recall of NDE, flashbulb and control autobiographical events
that occurred around the same time. To do so, we used the AI
which provides reliable and valid indices of episodic and semantic
contributions to personal remote memories.
First, analysis of verbal recollections highlighted that NDE
memories include a higher overall amount of details and a
higher amount of internal/episodic details than flashbulb and
autobiographical memories. This is consistent with previous
studies suggesting a particularly high amount of qualitative
characteristics associated with NDE memories in comparison
with other types of memories (e.g., Thonnard et al., 2013;
Moore and Greyson, 2017). Moreover, the difference between
the number of internal and external details for NDE memories
TABLE 4 | Association between CES total scores and sMCQ items.
Rho S p-value
Reexperiencing 0.345 46050 0.002*
Visual details 0.117 62073 0.317
Other sensory details 0.178 57782 0.126
Location −0.019 71639 0.871
Time −0.284 90260 0.014
Coherence 0.109 62650 0.353
Verbal component 0.030 68214 0.801
Feeling emotions 0.427 40280 <0.003*
Real/imagined 0.196 56539 0.092
One’s own actions 0.205 55898 0.078
One’s own words 0.162 58881 0.164
One’s own thoughts 0.246 53000 0.033
Visual perspective 0.322 47666 0.005
Valence 0.281 50543 0.015
Personal importance 0.713 20145 <0.003*
Reactivation frequency 0.399 42191 <0.003*
*Results are significant. Results are considered statistically significant at p < 0.003
after Bonferroni correction.
is significantly larger than the one observed for flashbulb and
autobiographical memories. The richness and high amount of
overall details (and particularly internal/episodic information)
delivered for NDE memories, compared to other more or
less notable memories dating from the same period, could be
explained by various factors. First, a NDE itself is characterized
by an exceptional and unique association between unusual
perceptions (such as the impression of leaving the physical
body, entering a different dimension or being in an unknown
spatio-temporal dimension) and a clear sensorium and intense
sensation of “reality” (i.e., comparable to the sense of certainty
that accompanies everyday perception; Schwaninger et al., 2002;
Dell’Olio, 2010), conditions that are likely to lead to vivid
memories. Second, previous studies have highlighted a tendency
toward a decline in memory reports (normal forgetting process)
in flashbulb memories in comparison with other emotionally
arousing events (e.g., Christianson, 1989; Christianson and
Engelberg, 1999). Consistency and amplification of memories
over time would be conditioned by one’s degree of involvement
and the severity of the emotionally arousing event (Neisser
et al., 1996; van Giezen et al., 2005). In line with this view,
studies including participants who were directly exposed to
or personally involved in traumatic events identified different
memory patterns than studies addressing flashbulb memories,
in which subjects were not personally involved in the emotional
event. In fact, some studies have even shown that unlike the
emotionally charged traumatic events whose narratives become
richer over time, flashbulb memories rather tend to decline
(Krinsley et al., 2003; van Giezen et al., 2005). When looking
closer at the subtypes of details that have been recalled, we
identified more event and perceptual internal details within the
NDE memory, as compared to flashbulb and autobiographical
memories. Specifically, event details describe the unfolding of
the story, and perceptual details comprise auditory, olfactory,
tactile, taste, visual and spatial-temporal (allocentric-egocentric
space, body position and duration) information. Some authors
suggested that the overall quantity of details comprised in
NDE memories could be due to the fact that self-referential
information can improve recalling performances (Conway and
Dewhurst, 1995). Specifically, self-referential information would
enhance the encoding process, the organization in memory, as
well as the enrichment of the event by extended knowledge
(Conway and Dewhurst, 1995). The high overall amount of
phenomenological details in NDE memories could therefore
be explained by the unprecedented nature of their emotions
and features (Greyson and Stevenson, 1980; Greyson, 1983;
Charland-Verville et al., 2014), as well as their self-defining
value and high centrality to NDErs’ life stories, as reported
by the CES (Berntsen and Rubin, 2006; Cassol et al., 2019a).
From a broader cognitive perspective, the high amount of details
observed in verbal recollections of NDE memories is interesting
as it suggests that people might be able to recall memories of
a moment characterized by an altered state of consciousness
where the brain and its associated processes are thought to be
working with altered capacities. Nevertheless, it is still unclear
when exactly these events are experienced as well as when their
memory encoding precisely occurs.
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Second, we compared the phenomenological characteristics
(i.e., sMCQ scores) as well as the consequentiality and centrality
(i.e., CES scores) of NDE, flashbulb and autobiographical
memories. The analyses revealed that sMCQ scores related
to NDEs and autobiographical memories were higher than
those of flashbulb memories regarding the sensation of feeling
the emotions felt during the event while remembering, their
importance and their reactivation frequency. Moreover, the
feeling of mentally reliving the event was higher for the
autobiographical memory compared to the flashbulb memory.
The finding that NDEs are emotionally highly charged and
constitute an important part of NDErs’ life story is in line
previous reports (e.g., Greyson, 1997; Bianco et al., 2017;
Cassol et al., 2019a). On the contrary, the high scores of
autobiographical memories might seem unexpected but could
find explanation in the fact that some of them were somewhat
connected to the NDE. Indeed, NDErs have lived their NDE
several decades ago in average and reported difficulties when
having to recall another event from the same period. From
then on, recalled autobiographical memories were events closely
linked to their NDE/coma (i.e., return to their daily lives
after a long hospitalization, recovery after their coma) or
significant/life-changing events such as a child birth or their
encounter with their spouse (i.e., categories of memories that
have typically been reported as self-defining in previous studies;
e.g., Cassol et al., 2019a). Furthermore, regarding reactivation
frequency, it has been shown that shocking memories of personal
events are more thought and talked about than news reception
memories such as flashbulb events (Pillemer, 2009). Finally,
we also noted significant differences regarding the perspective
taken during recollection. Autobiographical memories can either
be retrieved from the first person perspective, in which the
experience is visualized through one’s own eyes, or from
the third person perspective, in which the experience is
seen through an observer’s eyes (Nigro and Neisser, 1983).
While participants tended to see the scene from their own
perspective (field perspective) when recalling their NDE and
their autobiographical memory, it was less the case for flashbulb
memories for which they were more likely to see themselves
from an observer’s perspective. Adopted visual perspectives
are influenced by different variables and appear to be the
consequence of contextual as well as dispositional factors,
and/or their interaction (Nigro and Neisser, 1983; Sutin and
Robins, 2008). These findings are consistent with previous
research (Robinson and Swanson, 1993; Sutin and Robins,
2008) highlighting that first-person memories are generally
rated higher on the phenomenological dimensions related to
the reliving of a memory. Moreover, it has been shown
that the adoption of a third-person perspective could be an
avoidance strategy set up to distance the individual from a
memory and reduce its emotional intensity (Kenny and Bryant,
2007; Sutin and Robins, 2008). Therefore, the difference in
the adopted visual perspective could be due to the emotions
felt at the time of the event (i.e., valence), that are overall
very positive in NDE as well as in autobiographical memories
and more negative in case of flashbulb events. Regarding
centrality, answers to the CES revealed that NDE memories
had the higher scores, followed by autobiographical memories
and then by flashbulb memories. These findings corroborate
previous findings and confirm the particular status of NDEs
with regard to NDErs’ identities and life stories (Cassol
et al., 2019a). The lower scores associated with flashbulb
memories highlight the distinction between the consequences
that one predicts when hearing about a surprising event and
its actual impact on one’s life. These results are consistent
with previous research on hearing shocking public events that
have shown lower life impact, consequentiality, and personal
importance (Pillemer, 2009). In addition, we found that the
amount of episodic details provided upon recall, the feeling
of reexperiencing the event while remembering, the feeling
of reexperiencing the emotions felt at the time of the event
and the reactivation frequency of the event in memory
were all associated to the reported centrality of the event,
regardless of the memory type. It is therefore reasonable to
hypothesize that central/landmark events could benefit from a
preferential encoding in autobiographical memory and lead to a
richer phenomenology.
Finally, we would like to mention limitations to this study.
NDErs voluntarily contacted us after calls in the lay media
and our sample consequently may suffer from a self-selection
bias. Moreover, given the relative scarcity of NDEs and the
fact that we had to meet participants personally in accordance
to the AI protocol, we were limited in the recruitment of
our participants and our sample is relatively small. Therefore,
results should be confirmed by larger studies. Besides, human
memory is by definition a reconstructive process (Schacter
et al., 1998) sensitive to numerous factors such as aging
(e.g., Devitt et al., 2017); therefore, the generalizability of our
results could also be impacted by the fact that all memories
are drawn from a homogenous pool of NDErs. To address
this issue, it would be interesting to assess autobiographical
and flashbulb memories in healthy controls and to further
explore the cognitive processes specific to NDErs, especially since
previous studies suggest a specific cognitive profile, including
a propensity for dissociation (Greyson, 2000a) and illusory
recollections (Martial et al., 2017c). In the present study, we
did not control for the production of false memories and
the subjective feeling of remembering that may accompany
false remembering (i.e., illusory recollection). In this context,
it is difficult to control for the veracity of the personal
memories recalled by NDErs. Nonetheless, we believe that the
production of false memories and illusory recollections would
have affected the three subtypes of memories equally. Indeed,
some factors such as age and affect were shown to impact
the emergence of false memories. Specifically, affective items
induce more false recollections than neutral ones (Dehon et al.,
2010), and age was shown to impact the attribution of the
source (auditory vs. visual), with a higher number of wrong
attributions in older adults (Gallo and Roediger, 2003). Given
the design of our study (i.e., within subject measures) and the
temporal proximity between events, the three types of memories
should have been impacted similarly by the age of participants.
Regarding affect, all memories were highly emotional, albeit
autobiographical and NDE memories were associated with
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positive emotions and flashbulb memories with negative ones.
Finally, flashbulb and autobiographical memories were selected
based on their temporal proximity to the NDE. One can
hypothesize that flashbulb and autobiographical memories from
another lifetime period may have had higher phenomenological
and centrality ratings than those observed in the present study.
CONCLUSION
We used the AI scoring protocol to explore the verbal content of
three remote autobiographical memories in a sample of NDErs:
the NDE, a flashbulb and a control autobiographical memory.
Overall, NDE verbal recollections include a higher overall
amount of details and a higher amount of internal/episodic
details than flashbulb and autobiographical memories. More
precisely, they comprise more event and perceptual internal
details. Moreover, we found that flashbulb memories are
associated to a lower intensity of feelings while remembering and
a lower personal importance, and are less reactivated and less
susceptible to be remembered from a first person perspective.
Finally, NDE memories are more central than autobiographical
memories, which in turn are more central than flashbulb
memories. Besides, more central events contain more episodic
verbal details. Overall, our results fall in line with existing
literature that highlights the uniqueness of NDE memories.
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